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MILITARY LAW-"ln Time of War" Under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice:
An Elusive Standard
Clayton Anderson, Specalist Four, United States Army, absented
himself from his unit without authority on November 3, 1964. Over
two years later, he surrendered to civilian authorities who returned
him to military control; Anderson was charged with desertion1 and
convicted by a general court-martial.2 Because of the Government's
failure to prove that Anderson intended to leave his unit permanently, the board of review, 3 on appeal, found him guilty of the
lesser offense of unauthorized absence.4 But Anderson's case involved
another issue. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
an unauthorized absence in peacetime cannot be prosecuted if the
offense was committed more than two years before the receipt of
sworn charges and specifications by an officer exercising summary
court-martial jurisdiction over the command. 5 However, in time of
war there is no applicable statute of limitation. 6 The board of review considered the effect of these provisions and determined that
Anderson's offense was committed "in time of war" within the meaning of the UCMJ; 7 thus he could be tried and punished regardless
1. The offense of desertion is defined by article 85 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 885 (1964).
2. See United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.M.C.A. 589, 38 C.M.R. 386 (1968) (C.M.
416,112).
3. The extent of the board of review's authority is set out in article 66 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1964).
4. 38 C.M.R. 582 (1968). The offense of unauthorized absence is defined by article
86 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 886 (1964). Any reviewing
authority with power to approve or affirm a finding of guilty may approve or affirm,
instead, so much of the finding as includes a lesser included offense. Uniform Code
of Military Justice art. 59, 10 U.S.C. § 859 (1964).
5. UCMJ art. 43(c), 10 U.S.C. § 843(c) (1964). The period of limitation prescribed
by the article begins to run on the date the offender first absents himself without
leave. !13 OP. ATTY. GEN. 121 (1922).
6. UCMJ art. 4!1(a), 10 U.S.C. § 84!1(a) (1964) provides that: "A person charged
with desertion or absence without leave in time of war, or with aiding the enemy,
mutiny, or murder, may be tried and punished at any time without limitation."
7. !18 C.M.R. 582 (1968).
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of when he went "a.w.o.l." From the board of review, the case was
appealed to the United States Court of Military Appeals. 8 All three
judges agreed that the United States was at war on November 3,
1964; therefore, the court affirmed Anderson's conviction.9
The consequences of this holding are profound. The Court of
Military Appeals is the highest military court in the nation, and
its decisions are binding on all other military courts. By holding
that a state of war existed as of November 3, 1964-and presumably
at all times since that date-the court has activated three groups of
special provisions in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. First, as
in Anderson, there are many offenses which can be prosecuted without reference to statutes of limitation if they are committed in time of
war. These offenses include absence without leave, desertion, aiding
the enemy, mutiny, and murder.10 Moreover, if it is certified11 to
the President that the trial in time of war of any offense will be
detrimental to the prosecution of the war or inimical to national
security, the prescribed period of limitation is extended until six
months after the termination of hostilities.12 Finally, when the
United States is at war, the running of the statute of limitations
applicable to any UCMJ offense involving fraud or attempted fraud
against the United States in connection with transfers and control
of United States property or war-related contractual agreements is
suspended until three years after the termination of hostilities.13
The second major effect of determination that a state of war exists
is upon the severity of penalties for certain offenses under the
UCMJ; desertion, 14 assaulting an officer,15 and misbehavior of a
sentinel16 are all punishable by death only in wartime. In addition,
misconduct as a prisoner17 and spying18 are punishable under the
8. The United States Court of Military Appeals consists of three civilian judges
appointed for a term of fifteen years by the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate. This court may prescribe its own rules of procedure. The review
jurisdiction of the Court extends to:
(1) all cases in which the sentence, as affirmed by a board of review, affects a
general or flag officer or extends to death;
(2) all cases reviewed by a board or review which the Judge Advocate General
orders sent to the Court of Military Appeals for review; and
(3) all cases reviewed by a board of review in which, upon petition of the accused and on good cause shown, the Court of Military Appeals has granted a
review.
UCMJ art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1964).
9. United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 38 C.M.R. 386 (1968).
10. UCMJ art. 43(a), 10 U.S.C. § 843(a) (1964). This provision is reproduced in
note 6 supra.
11. This certification must be performed by the Secretary of the appropriate
branch of the armed services. UCMJ art. 43(e), 10 U.S.C. § 843(e) (1964).
12. UCMJ art. 43(e), 10 U.S.C. § 843(e) (1964).
13. UCMJ art. 43(f), 10 U.S.C. § 843(f) (1964).
14. UCMJ art. 85(c), 10 U.S.C. § 885(c) (1964).
15. UCMJ art. 90, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1964).
16. UCMJ art. 113, 10 U.S.C. § 913 (1964).
17. UCMJ art. 105, 10 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
18. UCMJ art. 106, 10 U.S.C. § 906 (1964).
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UCMJ only during a state of war. Third, and perhaps most important, the existence of a state of war may extend military jurisdiction over a significant number of civilians not otherwise subject to
military control. The Uniform Code of Military Justice states that
"[i]n time of war, persons serving with or accompanying an armed
force in the field" are subject to its provisions. 19 Although several
Supreme Court decisions have curtailed the extension of military
jurisdiction to civilians,20 these cases dealt with peacetime situations
and presumably have had no effect upon previous decisions sustaining military court-martial jurisdiction over civilians serving with
or accompanying the armed forces in the field in time of war. 21
Therefore, the decision in the Anderson case apparently extends
the application of military law to many American ci'1,lians in
Vietnam who were not subject to such jurisdiction prior to November 3, 1964.22 Indeed, under previous decisions as to what constitutes being "in the field," 23 military jurisdiction over civilians
could extend to areas other than Vietnam.
In Anderson, the three judges of the Court of Military Appeals
were unable to agree on the grounds for their conclusion that a
state of war exists.24 In light of this disagreement and the severe
consequences resulting from a finding of the existence of "a state of
war" for purposes of the UCMJ, it seems important to analyze the
approaches employed by the individual judges to support their
decisions. This Note will present such an analysis, investigate the
deficiencies of the current language in the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, and suggest an alternative to the elusive standard that
presently exists.
19. UCMJ art. 2(10), IO U.S.C. § 802(10) (1964).
20. Cases in which the Supreme Court has held that civilians are not subject to
peacetime military jurisdiction include: McEiroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo,
361 U.S. 281 (1960) (civilian government employee charged with noncapital felony);
Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (civilian government employee charged with
capital offense); Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (dependent charged with
noncapital felony). See generally Ehrenhaft, Policing Civilians Accompanying the
United States Armed Forces Overseas: Can United States Commissioners Fill the
Jurisdictional Gap'!, 36 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 273 (1967); Bishop, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Military-Civilian Hybrids, II2 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 317 (1964); Girard, The
Constitution and Court-Martial of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces-A
Preliminary Analysis, 13 STAN. L. R.Ev. 461 (1961).
21. Perlstein v. United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. granted, 327 U.S.
777, cert. dismissed, 328 U.S. 822 (1946); Hammond v. Squier, 51 F. Supp. 227 (D.D.C.
1943); In re Di Bartolo, 50 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
22. But see Wiener, Courts Martial for Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces
in Vietnam, 54 A.B.A.J. 24 Uan. 1966).
23. See McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1943) (a military voyage
for the purpose of transporting army troops and supplies during war is a military
expedition "in the field" within the meaning of a section relating to persons subject
to military law); Hines v. Mikell, 259 F. 28 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 645
(1919) (the phrase "in the field" is used in its military sense, and includes forces in
cantonments and training camps within and without the United States).
24. See notes 25-40 infra and accompanying text.
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The board of review in Anderson based its conclusion that a
state of war exists primarily on the ground that the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, 25 passed by Congress on August 10, 1964, constituted
"official recognition" that the United States was engaged in an
"overt confrontation of arms between opposing powers."26 Chief
Judge Quinn, who wrote the Anderson opinion for the Court of
Military Appeals, also accepted the language of the Resolution as a
clear indication that Congress had recognized and declared "that
the Gulf of Tonkin attack precipitated a state of armed conflict
between the United States and North Vietnam." 27 The opinion of
Judge Quinn does not indicate why congressional recognition of a
"state of armed conflict" was tantamount to recognition that the
nation had entered a "time of war," or why it compelled such a conclusion by the court. He refused to accept the defendant's arguments
that the Resolution merely reiterated the American responsibilities
under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty28 and that it was
not a determination that the United States was at war. 29 Responding
to these contentions, Judge Quinn stressed that the executive
branch, through Under-Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, had characterized the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as "participation by Congress 'in the functional way . . . contemplated by
the Founding Fathers' to 'invoke the ... war powers.' " 3° Conceding
that members of the administration do not always offer the definitive
statement of congressional intent31 and that several members of the
Senate disagreed with such a characterization of the Resolution,32
25. Joint Resolution to promote the maintenance of international peace and
security in southeast Asia, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
26. United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 589, 38 C.M.R. 386, 387 (1968).
The language of the resolution acknowledges that American vessels had been attacked
by the Communist regime in Vietnam and authorize the President to take whatever
measures he deems necessary to assure the peace and security of that area. It does not,
however, recognize an "overt confrontation of arms between opposing powers." 78
Stat. 384 (1964).
27. United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 589, 38 C.M.R. 386, 387 (1968).
28. [1954] 6 U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170.
29. Quinn also rejected the defense argument that the Gulf of Tonkin attack
(against the destroyer U.S.S. Maddox on August 2, 1964, and two other United States
destroyers on August 4, 1964) was an isolated incident insufficient to constitute a state
of war. He deemed both the exact proportions of that attack and the nature of the
United States response to it irrelevant to the state of war issue. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at
589-90, 38 C.M.R. at 387-88. Nor would he accept the argument that later North
Vietnamese attacks on U.S. forces at Plieku (February 7, 1965), with the attendant reciprocal forceful measures enlarging the conflict, created a new relationship which
did not exist at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin attack. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 590, 38
C.M.R. at 388.
30. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 590, 38 C.M.R. at 388, quoting Hearings on S. Res. 151 Before
the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. on the United States Commitments to Foreign
Powers, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 161-62 (1965).
31. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 590, 38 C.M.R. at 388. See also note 56 infra.
32. See Hearings, supra note 30, at 118-32; Hearings on the Gulf of Tonkin, The
1961 Incidents, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at
81 (1966).

February 1969]

Notes

845

Judge Quinn nevertheless stated that "when a state of hostilities is
expressly recognized by both Congress and the President, it is incumbent upon the judiciary to accept the consequences that attach to
such recognition." 33 Again, he equated congressional recognition of
a "state of hostilities" with the "state of war" requirement that
activates the sections of the UCMJ discussed above. 34
Judges Kilday and Ferguson disagreed with Judge Quinn about
the meaning and effect of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Judge
Kilday felt that the emphasis on the Resolution was misplaced since
the existence of a state of war at any particular time is not necessarily determined solely by congressional certification; 35 to him, the
Resolution represented only "a congressional appraisal of world
happenings." 36 It was not, according to Judge Kilday, the Resolution itself, but rather the events of which the Resolution took
cognizance that were the real reasons why the United States was at
war with North Vietnam in 1964. Citing authority for the proposition that war may exist without congressional declaration, 37 Judge
Kilday concluded that a state of war existed for "obvious reasons." 38
Judge Ferguson adopted a similar view of the Resolution. For him,
however, it was unnecessary even to consider the Resolution, "either
as a declaration of war ... or as evidence of existence of confl.ict." 39
He admitted that war had not been declared formally "in the Constitutional sense," but, in an approach similar to the "obvious reasons" rationale of Judge Kilday, he contended that "the fact remains
that we are at war." 40 At this point, it is also important to recognize
that both of the concurring judges failed to specify the events or
factors-or the manner of weighing such events or factors-which
they relied upon to conclude that a state of war existed as of the
fall of 1964.
American courts seem never to have been able to agree on standards for determining the existence of a state of war. To a large
extent, judicial definitions and standards apparently turn on the
context in which the question arises. Thus, a situation deemed to
activate the "in time of war" provisions in the UCMJ may not necessarily preclude recovery by beneficiaries of life insurance policies
which include clauses denying benefits when death is a result of
war. 41 Although the insurance cases generally deem a formal declara33. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 590, 38 C.M.R. at 388.
34. See notes 5-19 supra and accompanying text.
35. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 591, 38 C.M.R. at 389.
36. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 594, 38 C.M.R. at 392.
37. See notes 43.47 infra and accompanying text.
38. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 593, 38 C.M.R. at 391.
39. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 594, 38 C.M.R. at 392.
40. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 594, 38 C.M.R. at 392.
41. World War II; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir.
1946) (congressional declaration not required); Pang v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 37
Hawaii 208 (1945) (congressional declaration necessary); Rosenau v, Idaho Mut. Ben.
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tion of war by Congress to be the event that the parties to an insurance contract intended to trigger such a clause, even in that
limited area there is not complete agreement.42
Outside the insurance litigation context, there is general agreement that a state of war can exist without a formal declaration by
Congress. As early as 1800, in a case arising out of American and
French seizures of each other's ships, the Supreme Court found that
the United States was at war without a formal declaration.43 Similarly, the Texas Court of Appeals characterized the American intervention in Mexico in 1918 as "war," even in the absence of conAssn., 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227 (1944) (congressional declaration necessary): West v.
Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 422, 25 S.E.2d 475 (1943) (congressional declaration required).
Korea: Harding v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 270, 95 A.2d 221, cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 812 (1953) (congressional declaration necessary); Beley v. Pennsylvania
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953) (congressional declaration necessary); Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152
Texas 559, 261 S.W.2d 554 (1953) (congressional declaration not required).
In recent years, insurance companies have avoided this problem by either substituting the phrase "during combat" or by specifically stating "acts of war, both declared and undeclared" in the policy.
42. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, several
cases came before the courts in which the actual date of inception of the war became
the sole issue of controversy. These cases concerned insurance contracts which contained clauses that denied certain death benefits if death occurred as a result of war
or any incident thereto. The insured in each case was killed in the December 7
attack on Pearl Harbor. The insurers denied liability for the accidental death benefits
on the ground that the war began on December 7, from the moment the attack commenced. The beneficiaries contended that there was no war until it was formally
declared by Congress, which has sole constitutional authority to declare war. U.S.
CONST., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10. Basing their authority on this provision of the Constitution, the majority of the courts in these cases held that the war, within the meaning of
the insurance contract, did not exist until declared by Congress on December 8, 1941.
See cases cited note 41 supra.
The same issue arose during the conflict in Korea. The Supreme Court of Texas
decided in Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 Texas 559, 261 S.W.2d 554
(1953), that an insured army officer who died in the crash of a military airplane in
which he was traveling, under military orders, was not entitled to recover under the
double indemnity provision of the policy because his death occurred in time of war.
But again, not all courts were in agreement that the conflict constituted a war. For
some courts, the lack of a congressional declaration was sufficient to remove the
conflict from classification as a state of war, regardless of the intensity of hostilities
there involved. See cases cited note 41 supra.
43. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). Justice Moore, writing for the Court,
asked, at 39, "by what other word the idea of the relative situation of America and
France could be communicated, than by that of hostilities, or war?" Concurring,
Justice Washington stated, at 42, that even without a declaration of war by Congress,
"in fact and in law we are at war . . . ."
However, the U.S. Court of Claims approximately eighty years later in several
cases involving claims of those whose ships and goods had been destroyed or captured
by the French stated: "We are ••. of the opinion that no such war existed as
operated to abrogate treaties, to suspend private rights, or to authorize indiscriminate
seizures •••-that in short it was no public war, but a limited war in its nature similar
to a prolonged series of reprisals." Gray, Admr. v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340 (1886);
see also Hooper, Admr. v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408 (1887).
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gressional declaration. 44 The use of American forces to protect
citizens and representatives of this country in China during the
Boxer Uprising again raised the issue of undeclared war. In Hamilton v. McLaughry, 45 a United States circuit court held that a formal
declaration was unnecessary to the finding that a state of war existed;
the court asserted that the judicial branch was bound by the determination of that issue by the political department of the government.40 The court then stated that the increase of military pay for
troops in China to wartime standards was sufficient recognition by a
political department of the existence of war.
Thus, even before the adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, there was substantial authority for the proposition that
a state of war may exist without a formal declaration by Congress.
It may fairly be stated, however, that these cases provided neither a
satisfactory definition of war47 nor workable standards by which its
existence could be measured.
In determining when the nation is "in time of war" for purposes
of the UCMJ, the military courts generally have not tried to formulate a definition of war; rather, they have followed the civilian
courts in basing their determination on practical considerations. The
involvement of American forces in Korea provided the first opportunity for the United States Court of Military Appeals to consider
the "state of war" language of the UCMJ. In United States v. Bancroft,48 the accused was convicted by special court-martial for sleeping on post. The board of review found that a state of war existed
in Korea at the time the offense was committed.49 Thus, it held that
since the offense charged carried a possible death penalty during
44. Arce v. Texas, 83 Tex. Crim. 292, 202 S.W. 951 (1818). Faced with the question
whether a killing committed during the period when Pershing led the American
Expeditionary Force into Mexico was murder because committed in peacetime, or not
because committed in time of war, the court stated: "'While an invasion of Mexico
••• was not a public war, or not preceded by a declaration of war against Mexico
by the United States ••• it was technically and within the limited meaning of the
word war." 83 Tc.x. Crim. at 295, 202 S."W. at 952.
45. 136 F. 445 (C.C. Kan, 1905).
46. 136 F. at 449.
47. See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40 (1800) ("It may .•• be safely laid
down, that every contention by force, in external matters, under the authority of
their respective governments, is not only war, but public war.'). See also New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260, 264 (10th Cir. 1946). The doubtful relevance
of these definitions of war to situations involving typical modern limited warfare,
such as the Vietnam conflict in 1964, is obvious. Moreover, even if relevant, such
definitions fail to take account of degrees of force which must be considered carefully
if a line is to be drawn between war and peace. See, e.g., F. GROB, THE RELATIVITY OF
WAR AND PEACE 283-89 (1949).
48. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953); in two earlier cases, the court, without
deciding the issue, accepted the stipulation of the parties that the Korean conflict con•
stituted war. See United States v. Horner, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 478, 9 C.M.R. 108 (1953);
United States v. Young, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 470, 9 C.M.R. 100 (1953).
49. See United States v. Bancroft, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953).
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wartime,110 it was a capital case not within the jurisdiction of the
special court-martial. 151 The Court of Military Appeals unanimously
affirmed. 52
In its consideration of whether a state of war existed in Korea,
the court indicated that it was irrelevant whether authorization for
the United States military involvement came from Congress, the
United Nations, or the President. 53 It relied instead on the nature
of the involvement itself. In support of its finding of a state of war
it cited the movement and presence of large numbers of American
military personnel on the battlefields in Korea, the large number
of casualties, the large draft of recruits, the national emergency
legislation, and the tremendous expenditures for operations in the
Korean theater. 54 Indeed, the court believed that "it would be an
insult to the efforts of those servicemen who are daily risking their
lives in defense of democratic principles to hold that peacetime conditions prevail."55
According to the court in Bancroft, it was the intent of Congress56 in enacting the UCMJ that the phrase "in time of war" apply
regardless of formal congressional declaration. 57 This conclusion
was especially appropriate, according to the court, since the primary
effect of such a determination is to strengthen military discipline in
the area of combat. Thus, when the President ordered the armed
forces into the Korean conflict, "he involved this country in hostilities to such an extent that a state of war existed." 58
50. UCMJ art. 113, IO U.S.C. § 913 (1964).
51. See United States v. Bancroft, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, II C.M.R. 3 (1953). UCMJ art.
19, IO U.S.C. § 819 (1964) withdraws jurisdiction from the special court-martial in
such a case.
52. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, II C.M.R. 3 (1953).
53. 3 U.S.C.M.A. at 5, II C.M.R. at 5.
54. 3 U.S.C.M.A. at 5-6, 11 CM.R. at 5-6 (1953).
55. 3 U.S.C.M.A. at 6, II C.M.R. at 6 (1953).
56. There is no discussion concerning the phrase "in time of war" in the committee
hearings and reports of either the House of Representatives or the Senate. See H.R.
REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); S. REP. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949);
Hearings on H.R. 4080, Establishing a Uniform Code of Military Justice, Before the
House Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. vol. 1 (1949). Likewise, there
was no discussion of the phrase during congressional debate prior to passage. See
95 CONG. R.Ec. 5718 (1949); 96 CONG. R.Ec. 1412 (1950).
57. 3 U.S.C.M.A. at 6, II C.M.R. at 6; "when Congress used the phrase 'in time of
war' in the military Code, it intended the phrase to apply to that state regardless of
whether it was initiated or continued with or without a formal declaration." No
authority was cited for this proposition. See note 56 supra.
58. 3 U.S.C.M.A. at 6, II C.M.R. at 6 (1953). The court also relied on two other
factors in support of its conclusion. First, Congress had not seen fit to narrow the
scope of the "time of war" formula even though prior to the effective date of the
UCMJ, the Judicial Council, in United States v. Gilbert, 9 BR-JC 183 (1950), had held
that the Korean conflict constituted a state of war. Second, the court found support
in congressional allowance of additional exclusions from gross income for federal tax
purposes to officers and enlisted men serving "in a combat zone." 26 U.S.C. 322(b}(B)
(1964). Pursuant to this section, the President had designated Korea and the surrounding waters as a combat area. Exec. Order No. 10,195, 15 Fed. Reg. 9177 (1950),

February 1969]

Notes

849

In keeping with the emphasis in Bancroft on the practical importance of military discipline in wartime, the Court of Military
Appeals, in United States v. Ayers, 59 held that the provisions imposing stricter discipline in wartime were also applicable to offenses
committed in the United States during the Korean fighting. In
Ayers, on facts similar to those in Anderson, the court noted that
whether defection occurs at a port of embarkation on the eve of a
shipment of personnel or after a unit's arrival in the theatre of
conflict, the gravity of the offense-and the need for disciplineremain the same. 00
Finally, the Court of Military Appeals was faced with the question of whether and when the state of war engendered by the Korean
conflict had come to an end. Consistent with its prior reliance on
"practicality" and "reality," the court in United States v. Shell 61
found a significant change in the conditions upon which it had
predicated its prior holdings; therefore, it held that the state of war
had ended. Specifically, the court in Shell relied upon the complete
cessation of all armed conflict in Korea, 62 establishment of a demilitarized zone, the repatriation of war prisoners, and the change
of American strategy in Korea from repelling aggression to maintaining the status quo. 63 However, it is significant to note that the
date chosen by the court as marking the end of the state of war was
in fact the date of the signing of the Korean Armistice. 64
It is apparent that the approach now taken by the military
courts to the "in time of war" formulation in the UCMJ is subject
to serious criticism. While perhaps workable in the clear cases in
which war has been formally declared, it becomes, in the context of
modern conflict, an extremely indefinite standard. In the increasingly likely "tough" cases-in which there has been no formal
declaration, casualties occur but not extensively, troops are committed but not approaching full capacity, expenditures are high
but not high enough to burden the national economy, and in which
the nature of the fighting deviates substantially from traditional
wartime practice-it is doubtful that the "practical" approach
adopted by the court in Anderson will lead to consistent or meaningful results.
For many reasons, the executive and legislative branches of the
government are increasingly reluctant to declare or recognize the
existence of war. 65 Accepting the proposition that in times and areas
59. 4 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 15 C.M.R. 220 (1954).
60. 4 U.S.C.M.A. at 225, 15 C.M.R. at 225 (1954).
61. 7 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 2!1 C.M.R. llO (1957).
62. According to the court, this was a factor of "crucial importance" in all previous
cases in which a state of war was found to exist. 7 U.S.C.M.A. at 651, 23 C.M.R. at ll5.
63. 7 U.S.C.M.A. at 651, 23 C.M.R. at ll5.
64. 7 U.S.C.M.A. at 651, 23 C.M.R. at ll5.
65. To some extent this is a result of efforts in the international community to
outlaw war as an acceptable means of implementing national policy and the desire
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of conflict the military has a need for stronger disciplinary measures
to prosecute its objectives efficiently, the present ad hoc method of
concluding that the nation is "in time of war" is hardly conducive to
more effective discipline in the zone of combat. It seems to be asking too much of the military personnel serving in those zones to
require them to make an accurate assessment of the factors that a
court may later rely on in finding a state of war. If three judges on
the highest military court are unable to agree even upon the factors
to be considered, it is unlikely that servicemen and related personnel will conclude that the stronger measures are in force unless
and until a case has been prosecuted and decided and knowledge of
that decision has reached them. Thus, it is at least questionable,
under the present formulation, whether the UCMJ provisions can
be effective in accomplishing their major objective-strengthening
military discipline in the combat zone.
But an even more forceful objection to the present UC:MJ provisions employing the "in time of war" standard can be made; it
seems that there are the serious due process questions posed by
these provisions and their present interpretation. It is well settled
that "a law forbidding or requiring conduct in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application violates due process of law.'' 66 "While
the conduct proscribed by these provisions is presumably specified
clearly enough, the standards by which different sets of penalties
may be imposed are so vague that it is at least arguable that servicemen prosecuted under these provisions are not afforded the adequate notice to which they are entitled by fifth amendment's due
process guarantee. Although application of the vagueness concept
to the special penalty and statute of limitation provisions of the
UCMJ admittedly involves an extension of present precedent,G7 the
question of whether military jurisdiction extends to civilians servnot to interrupt treaty arrangements which may be suspended or modified with the
existence of a state of war. See, e.g., Layton, The Effect of .Measures Short of War on
Treaties, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 96 (1962).
66. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 364 (1964). See also United States v. Cardiff,
344 U.S. 174 (1952); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). Cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957);
Graccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
67. The usual situation involves a statute which describes an offense in tem1s that
are so indefinite that an individual would be unable to determine what kind of con•
duct is supposed to be prohibited. See text accompanying note 66 supra; Dombrowski
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (statutory definition of "subversive organization" in
a criminal statute proscribing various forms of participation in such organizations
held unconstitutional for vagueness). It would seem that the closest precedent to the
problem described in this Note is United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952). In
that case, the Court struck down the conviction of a factory manager who refused
to permit inspection by federal officials. The Court held that the provision of the
Federal Food and Drug Act prohibiting such refusal was too vague to inform the
manager that he was liable for prosecution if he refused to consent to inspection.
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ing with the military is keyed to the same "in time of war" standard.68 For a civilian serving with the armed forces, this standard
determines whether or not he is subject to the provisions of the
UCMJ; thus, the traditional authority on unconstitutional vagueness should apply to at least this situation. 69
Third, the present "time of war" formula does not admit of the
flexibility required of workable standards in this area. Once a state
of war has been deemed to exist, American servicemen all over the
world become subject to the harsher disciplinary measures. The
UCMJ does not permit geographical limits of application. The Anderson case is an apt illustration, as the defendant absented himself
from a Louisiana base far removed from the area of conflict in
Southeast Asia. Recognition of some geographic flexibility would result in a more satisfactory solution to the problems of adequate
notice and better discipline.
In order to establish fair and workable standards in this area of
military law, it is essential to recognize the sometimes competing
goals of the political and practical realities of modem day armed
conflict, the need for stricter penalties and more summary procedures for greater control and better discipline in the military in
combat zones, and the desirability of providing military personnel
and others serving with them adequate notice of the imposition of stricter disciplinary controls. Further manipulation of the
"in time of war" standard now found in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice is unnecessary and unprofitable. Rather, it would
be more effective to remove the source of ambiguity from the UCMJ
by omitting the phrase "in time of war" and substituting a more
precise criterion.
The UCMJ itself suggests an alternative that could accomplish
the objectives discussed above. Congress, in the exercise of its power
to regulate the armed forces, 70 provided in the UCMJ that the punishment which a court-martial may impose for an offense could not
exceed the limits prescribed by the President.71 Pursuant to this
provision, the President by executive order has established maximum limits of punishment.72 The executive order also provides that
immediately upon formal declaration of war the offenses punishable
by death in time of war are to be so punishable until formal termination of that war or until further executive order prior to formal
termination. 73
68. See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
!160 (1964); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451 (1939).
70. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8.
71. UCMJ art. 56, IO U.S.C. § 856 (1964).
72. Exec. Order No. 10214, 3 C.F.R. 408 (1949-53 comp.).
73. MANUAL FOR COURTS·MARTIAL 217 (1951).
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This delegation of authority to the President serves to insure
a minimum degree of uniformity in punishment application, to
provide notice to military personnel of the maximum penalties
they face for violations of the UCMJ, and to strengthen military
discipline by adjusting the severity of penalties according to the
seriousness of the offenses. Congress could have left the decision
about all penalties for UCMJ offenses-including death-completely
to the discretion of the President, provided that sufficient general
criteria were given within which the President might exercise that
discretion.74
Since the "in time of war" provisions of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice were designed to meet the exigencies of that occasion,75 it seems reasonable for Congress to direct that when any
situation exists in which the President, as Commander-in-Chief,
determines that increased military discipline is required for efficient
control of the armed forces, he may by executive order impose all
provisions of the UCMJ which currently are invoked only "in time
of war." The UCMJ could provide that the executive order would
remain in effect until revoked by subsequent order or by congressional resolution. 76 A companion provision could provide that
formal declaration of war by Congress also would activate the same
special provisions.
These changes in the UCMJ would answer many of the objections to the present formula. First, in cases like Anderson, it would
eliminate the need for a judicial determination of the existence of
war when there has not been a formal declaration. The elusive
standard now used for such judicial conclusions could be discarded.
Second, the military's need to insure discipline during combat and
comparable situations short of declared war would be satisfied by
presidential determination that such a need in fact exists. Third,
the due process requirement of adequate notice would be satisfied.
Servicemen and related personnel would receive notice that the
increased penalties were in effect and that the jurisdiction of the
74. See Ehmke, "Delegata Potestes Non Potest Delegari," A Maxim of American
Constitutional Law, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 50 (1961); Rossman, The Spirit of Laws: The
Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 35 A.B.A.J. 93 (1949); Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation
of Legislative Power, 47 CoLUM. L. REv. 359, 561 (1947).
75. Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before the House Armed Services Comm., 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1949).
76. Cf. the procedure followed under the Atomic Energy Commission Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2153 (1964), requiring presidential approval of cooperation with any nation
or regional defense organization in the atomic energy field. The statute provides
that the proposed agreement, together with the presidential approval, must be submitted to Congress, which then has sixty days to pass a resolution disfavoring the
agreement. However, in the military law context, this procedure would be inadequate
because of the delay that it entails. It also would force Congress to make a decision
at a time when it might be politically wise for the national legislature to refrain
from taking any official :position,
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UCMJ had been imposed through the issuance of an executive
order. Fourth, the exigencies of limited warfare could be better
accommodated, both geographically and militarily, by issuance of
an executive order enumerating changes in selected provisions of
the UC1"1J or directed to particular geographic areas in accordance
with the specific need. Fifth, since political considerations might
dictate that war should not be recognized either formally or informally, permitting an executive order to issue on standards other
than the existence of war would provide an expedient method to
impose the current wartime provisions of the UCMJ without risk
of diplomatic embarrassment.

